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Abstract
An alternative minimum tax (AMT) is often regarded as desirable. We analyze a wealth
tax at corporate and personal level that is designed as an AMT as proposed by the German
Green Party. This wealth tax is imputable to proﬁt taxes and is hence intended to prevent
multiple (multistage) taxation. Referring to data from annual reports and the German
Central Bank we model enterprises of diﬀerent structure, industry, size and legal status.
We show that companies in the service sector which generally maintain rather high gearing
rates are more frequently subjected to the wealth tax than capital intensive industries.
This result runs counter to well-known eﬀects of a common wealth tax. Capital intensive
ﬁrms, e.g. in the metal industry, are levied with deﬁnitive wealth tax only if they have large
loss carry-forwards or extremely volatile proﬁts. Furthermore, partnerships often enjoy
wealth tax privileges due to uniform taxation at individual level whereas corporations
may suﬀer from the wealth tax at corporate and personal level caused by imputation
backlogs. Obviously, the underlying AMT inﬂuences corporate dividend policy evoking a
push-out eﬀect. We prove that this kind of wealth taxation usually favors ﬁnancial rather
than real investment and encourages outbound investment. Consequently, introducing an
AMT discriminates against many ﬁrms and investment projects, especially if economic
income is lower than taxable income. This proves that whenever income is taxed correctly,
AMT is dispensable.
Keywords: alternative minimum tax, business strategy, investment decisions, wealth tax
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1 Introduction
Taxation of wealth or property has been a topic in tax reform discussions for years.1 Alt-
hough a classic tax on wealth as an additional tax on net wealth has been abolished in
several countries, non-proﬁt oriented taxation is still a subject of recent political debates,
recent tax reforms and public economic research activities. Due to budget deﬁcits and for
distributive reasons, levying an additional tax burden on wealthy individuals or corpora-
tions corresponds to the widespread desire for a ’soak the rich’ policy with a redistributive
character.
Recent German wealth tax debates have led to a concept of minimum taxation that was
proposed by Germany’s Green Party. This wealth tax is imputable to proﬁt taxes and is
hence intended to prevent multiple (multistage) taxation. In consequence, this wealth tax
has to be interpreted as a tax on calculated proﬁts, i.e. as a tax on income rather than
on wealth, similar to well-known minimum tax concepts.2
We take this minimum wealth tax as an example of AMT and analyze it at corporate and
personal level, according to the German Green Party’s proposal. Referring to data from
annual reports and the German Central Bank we model enterprises of diﬀerent structure,
industry, size and legal status. Furthermore, we investigate the inﬂuence of this wealth
tax on marginal investment decisions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: After an overview of international
practices of wealth taxation (chapter 2) we describe in chapter 3 diﬀerent concepts of
minimum taxation (3.1) and introduce an AMT wealth tax that is imputable to corporate
and income taxes (3.2). Chapter 4 is dedicated to the inﬂuence of this wealth tax on
business structures and investment decisions. In the subsections that follow we determine
the diﬀerent tax burdens on companies in various industries (chapter 4.1). Further, in
chapter 4.2 we investigate the inﬂuence of minimum wealth tax on marginal investment
decisions and draw some conclusions about international investment decisions in chapter
4.3. Chapter 5 contains ﬁnal conclusions and a summary.
1 E.g., cf. Mieszkowski (1972); Netzer (1973); McLure (1977); Wildasin (1982); Arnott (1998); Wijn-
bergen/Estache (1999); Dye/McGuire/Merriman (2001); Vlassenko (2001); Arnott/Petrova (2002).
2 E.g., cf. the taxation of so-called box 3 income in the Netherlands. For further details see chapter 3.3 Alternative Minimum Wealth Tax 2
2 Wealth Taxation in OECD Countries
OECD statistics on wealth taxation clarify that the degree of wealth-based taxation varies
signiﬁcantly between the member countries (ﬁgure 1).
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Figure 1: Revenues from asset taxation in % of GNP in selected OECD member countries
E.g, Austria and Germany’s GNP fraction of non-proﬁt oriented tax revenue is relatively
low. These ﬁgures serve as an important argument in favor of introducing a wealth tax
although its negative inﬂuence e.g. on businesses with temporary losses or severe liquidity
restrictions is well-known. In fact, only few OECD member countries have implemented a
classic individual wealth tax. In Europe these are Finland, France, Iceland, Luxembourg,
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Among these only Iceland, Luxembourg and
Switzerland levy an additional wealth tax at corporate level.
3 Alternative Minimum Wealth Tax
3.1 Concepts of AMT in Various Countries
Generally, an alternative minimum tax (AMT) is considered desirable because it is inten-
ded to ensure that taxpayers with substantial economic income cannot avoid taxation at
all but at least pay a ’minimum tax’. Against this background AMT concepts have been
implemented in many countries.3 Alternative Minimum Wealth Tax 3
E.g., in the US AMT was ﬁrst enacted in 1969 and structured as a tax that is added on
to a corporation’s regular tax liability. The 1986 Tax Reform Act replaced this add-on
minimum tax with the present law on AMT.3 This AMT is intended to ensure that no
corporation with substantial economic income can avoid signiﬁcant tax payments by using
exclusions, deductions and credits.4 This provision ensures that special deductions do not
lead to non-taxation of corporate gains. As the tax law gives preferential treatment to some
kinds of income and allows special deductions and credits for some kinds of expenses,
taxpayers who beneﬁt from these statutory provisions may have to pay an additional
tax called the AMT. It is a separate tax computation that, in eﬀect, eliminates many
deductions and credits and creates a tax liability for an individual who would otherwise
pay little or no tax. The corporate AMT income is taxed at ﬂat rate of 20%.5 As the
taxpayer may not be able to pay this tax from his current income but instead has to fall
back on his wealth, AMT burdens assets similar to a wealth tax. This is highlighted by
the analysis of Lyon (1997) who found out that, e.g., in 1993 more than 50% of the assets
in the manufacturing, transportation and public utility industries were subject to AMT.6
Further, the Netherlands introduced a diﬀerent type of minimum taxation. Income tax was
merged with what was formerly the wealth tax and a new income tax system established
that distinguishes between three categories of income. One of these categories is taxable
income from savings and investments (so-called box 3 income). Here, the tax levied on
income from savings and investments (such as dividends, capital gains, losses) is based on
the assumption that a taxable yield of 4% is made on the assets, irrespective of the actual
yield. This calculated income is taxed at a ﬂat rate of 30%.7
In Germany the introduction of loss oﬀset limitations into proﬁt taxation put AMT cha-
racteristics into legislation. It causes asymmetric taxation of gains and losses, enforces the
payment of taxes without positive economic income and thereby reduces an investor’s we-
alth under speciﬁc conditions.8 Additionally an imputable minimum wealth tax has been
proposed. Against this background, the eﬀects of a minimum wealth tax are the subject
of the following investigation.
Summarizing at this point, minimum taxation in the Netherlands guarantees the precise
taxation of an expected 4% yield. Conversely, the U.S. AMT and Germany’s loss oﬀset
limitations ensure rather imprecise minimum taxation.
3 E.g., cf. Auerbach (1986); Bernheim (1989); Lyon (1990); Lyon (1997); Wijnbergen/Estache (1999);
Burman/Gale/Rohaly (2002, 2003); Feenberg/Poterba (2003).
4 Cf. Joint Committee on Taxation (2002), p 7.
5 Cf. Internal Revenue Service (2004).
6 Cf. Lyon (1997), p. 115.
7 Ministry of Finance of The Netherlands (2004).
8 For a discussion on loss oﬀset limitation and asymmetric taxation cf. Auerbach (1986); Majd/Myers
(1986); Auerbach/Poterba (1987); Shevlin (1990); Eeckhoudt/Gollier (1997); Niemann (2004).3 Alternative Minimum Wealth Tax 4
Without describing the above mentioned examples from the Netherlands, the USA and
Germany in more detail we can see from this already that minimum taxation on the basis
of corporate or personal income (calculated or realized) is often similar to wealth taxation.
Moreover, wealth taxation can be interpreted as a tax on ﬁctive or calculated proﬁts. We
can conclude that taxation of wealth can be interpreted as taxation of speciﬁc income
calculated on basis of an assumed yield of the underlying assets and vice versa.
3.2 AMT as Imputable Wealth Tax
Introducing an imputable wealth tax hence aims to eliminate imbalances in business and
capital income taxation. In consequence, the concept of AMT wealth tax merely aims to
supplement or improve existing proﬁt and income taxation.
In this tax system a wealth tax is levied on private and operating wealth of individuals
and corporate wealth of corporations. Wealth is determined by the market value of the
assets or suitable proxies.9 The wealth tax rate usually is 1%. As corporate wealth is
taxed at corporate level and again as corporate shares at personal level avoiding double
or multistage taxation a halved wealth tax rate of 0.5% is applied at each level. Corporate
wealth tax is imputable to corporate tax while personal wealth tax is imputable to personal
income tax. If the calculated wealth tax is lower than corresponding proﬁt tax then wealth
tax is completely imputable. If a deﬁnitive wealth tax remains, a ﬁve year wealth tax carry-
forward allows future imputation on principle. Further, in order to protect small wealth
from being taxed,10 an annual tax allowance of e 200,000 for every adult taxpayer and of
e 2,000,000 for business assets and shares irrespective of the legal status of the company
is assumed.
A wealth tax that can be imputed to corporate and income tax only inﬂuences decisions
if it becomes deﬁnitive, i.e., if a non-imputable amount remains. This occurs whenever
proﬁts are extremely volatile or the company yield is rather low. If an individual faces a
marginal income tax rate of 42 %11 a 1% wealth tax rate invokes a deﬁnitive tax burden
as soon as the pre-tax rate of return of an investment is less than 2.38 %. In the case of an
investment within a partnership the required minimum rate of return increases to at least
3.6% due to German trade tax. Assuming a wealth tax at corporate and personal level of
0.5%, corporations need a pre-tax rate of return of 2.39% to avoid deﬁnitive wealth tax.
Further, the deﬁnitiveness of this minimum tax depends on dividend policy. If proﬁts are
retained in full, there is no income tax at personal level to be employed for imputation
9 As mentioned above, we neglect in our analysis problems of determining the correct value of non-listed
ﬁrms, assets with a long useful life etc.
10 For distributive reasons.
11 Which is Germany’s maximum marginal income tax rate.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 5
of personal wealth tax on corporate stock. Furthermore, imputation backlogs may occur
even for investments that exceed the required minimum rate of return for a speciﬁc time
horizon, if periodical proﬁts ﬂuctuate heavily, or temporary losses occur.
Although all kinds of wealth taxes face severe problems e.g. in determining the value of
non-listed ﬁrms and assets with a long useful life,12 in the following we abstract from these
aspects and focus on the economic implication of this tax beyond these diﬃculties.
4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Struc-
tures and Investment Decisions
4.1 Business Structure
4.1.1 Diﬀerent Types of Enterprises
We analyze the inﬂuence of the underlying wealth tax on selected types of company. We
concentrate on:
1. small craft and trade partnerships, 5-10 employees
2. small craft and trade (non-listed) corporations, 5-10 employees
3. medium-sized companies from metal working industry, 30 employees, turnover less
than e 2.5 million
4. capital intensive medium-sized corporations, in the metalworking industry, with ma-
naging shareholder, turnover between e 2.5 and 50 million, approx. 150 employees
5. large listed corporations (DAX 30 corporations), manufacturing industry
6. large listed corporations (DAX 30 corporations), ﬁnancial services
By exemplifying representative types of business we can draw conclusions as to how the
underlying wealth tax burdens companies of diﬀerent size and structure.13
Information from balance sheets and proﬁt and loss accounts for 2002 for company types 1
and 2 provided by the North-Rhine Westphalian Chamber of Crafts14 provides data for the
12 Asset valuation is indispensable not only for wealth tax purposes but for minimum taxation as
implemented in the Netherlands as well. Cf. Ministry of Finance of The Netherlands (2004), p. 21.
13 We leave aside the controversial discussion about analyses of representative ﬁrms and regard this
approach as a ﬁrst (simple) step for investigating this type of AMT. E.g., cf. Stiglitz (1987); Shevlin
(1990).
14 Cf. table 1; see Landesgewerbef¨ orderungsstelle des nordrhein-westf¨ alischen Handwerks e.V. (LGH)
(2003a, 2003b).4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 6
craft and trade companies. These data comprise comparisons of the average proﬁts, liqui-
dity and wealth of the underlying businesses collected by annual voluntary questionnaires.
Data on the asset structure of medium-sized businesses (types 3 and 4) were taken from
special publications of the German Federal Bank.15 These statistics include aggregated
data from balance sheets and proﬁt and loss statements of German companies from 1971
to 1996 and 1998 to 2000.16 Examples of large listed corporations were selected from the
major companies that are listed in the German stock exchange index DAX 30. Informati-
on from annual reports allowed us to model two representative corporations.17 Additional
details from the notes in these reports, e.g. referring to exceptional items18 were taken
into account in order to deduce typical industry related tax bases. Although the provided
information does not allow for perfect adjustment for tax purposes, this approach enables
us to draw general conclusions on how diﬀerent relations of income and wealth that are
typical for an industry will inﬂuence the tax burden.
For typical type 1, 2 and 3 businesses we assume the following structure:19
Small businesses
structure of the balance sheet and operating proﬁt in e
type 1 type 3
craft and trade craft and trade medium-sized
bakery car mechanics
net wealth - 24,000 12,500 105,000
liabilities 125,000 210,000 635,000
total property, plant and equipment 80,000 106,000 220,000
operating proﬁt 28,000 40,500 43,000
Table 1: Structure of small craft and trade partnerships and medium-sized companies
Considering a tax allowance of e 2,000,000 no wealth tax is levied on these businesses.
In all cases net wealth is lower than e 2,000,000, always generating a tax base of zero.
Additionally, taking future proﬁts into account and determining a combined tax base
consisting of a weighted average of the present value of future proﬁts and net asset value,20
15 Cf. German Federal Bank (1999, 2003).
16 80% of this data is based on balance sheets and proﬁt and loss statements that were prepared for the
tax authorities.
17 Cf. table 2.
18 E.g., we adjusted for exceptional capital gains or exceptional accelerated depreciations.
19 Note that the underlying data on net wealth only provides information on net equity according to the
balance sheet. Information on the market values of the ﬁrm is not available. Therefore, the indicated
net wealth only approximates real net wealth, i.e. the market value. Further, operating proﬁt in the
craft and trade sector includes calculatory employer’s salaries.
20 This valuation method is implemented in Germany’s Inheritance Tax Code Directives and called the
’Stuttgarter approach’.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 7
the limit of e 2,000,000 is again not exceeded. The legal status of the business (type
1 or type 2) does not inﬂuence this general result for the craft and trade companies.
Consequently, in the following analyses we leave aside these types of business that are
unaﬀected by wealth taxation.
Only for capital intensive medium-sized companies of type 4 or large corporations (types 5
and 6) asset and equity structures occur, inducing a positive wealth tax base and thereby
possibly a wealth tax burden.
Table 2 provides an overview of the analyzed representative asset and proﬁt structure of
type 4, 5 and 6 corporations.21
Further, table 2 clariﬁes that in contrast to small businesses, typical large companies
usually are subject to wealth tax. Since DAX 30 corporations vary widely in structure
depending on the industry we analyze two categories: a representative corporation from
the manufacturing industry and a representative corporation from the ﬁnancial services
industry. These (synthetic) companies were constructed on the basis of diﬀerent DAX 30
corporations in the industries in question.
Large businesses
structure of the balance sheet and proﬁt in em
type 4 type 5 type 6
capital intensive DAX 30 corporation
corporation
metalworking industry manufacturing ﬁnancial
turnover industry services
e 47 million
net wealth 6.41 23,715 36,959
capitalized market value - 46,000 39,000
liabilities 17.47 53,890 883,011
total property, plant and equipment 3.26 34,116 356,877
total assets 24.00 77,605 935,951
proﬁt according
to balance sheet 1.09 2,445 1,616
Table 2: Structure of medium-sized capital intensive companies and DAX 30 corporations
4.1.2 Model Framework
Employing methods of capital budgeting and simulations of tax assessments we determine
the tax burden of the underlying companies. We assume a time horizon of 10 years. Per
21 Note that capitalized market value is the average of the last quotation of every quarter of a year
multiplied with the number of released shares. Cf. German Federal Bank (1999, 2003) and various
DAX 30 corporations 1993-2003 annual reports.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 8
assumption, during these periods proﬁts are retained in full, thereby increases business
wealth. On the basis of a starting point for the proﬁt22 periodical proﬁts grow at the
expected GNP growth rate every year. The assumption of continuous growth is relaxed
in sensitivity analyses, e.g. by modelling volatile proﬁts during the time horizon.
We abstract from the sale of shares during the time horizon for simplicity and to keep
the observable eﬀects transparent. Applying the speciﬁc assumed company parameters
we deduce the tax bases for corporate, income and trade tax plus supplementary taxes
and ﬁnally the wealth tax in each period. We simulate the wealth tax according to the
description in chapter 3 and assume proﬁt taxation in line with German tax law applicable
in 2005. Interdependencies between the diﬀerent taxes are completely taken into account.
In case of DAX 30 corporations we focus on corporate level taxation, i.e. corporate tax,
supplementary tax, trade tax and corporate wealth tax. Although integrating personal
taxes into calculus is possible in principle, we neglect this level as taxational eﬀects at
personal level depend on various subjective factors. We need information on whether
the shareholder’s income is subject to personal wealth tax, on the shareholder’s relevant
income tax bracket, etc. Since this information is not available arbitrary assumptions
would be necessary indicating that general conclusion can not be drawn from such a model.
In contrast to medium-sized corporations, additionally, DAX 30 shareholders often have
earnings from other sources which may heavily inﬂuence their tax bracket and thereby
their tax burden. Thus, representative conclusions at personal level for large corporations
cannot be expected. Consequently, in this case we concentrate on corporate level taxes.
Conversely, for medium-sized companies that are usually formed by a small number of
shareholders or partners, it is necessary to consider the matter at both company and per-
sonal level. In these cases partners’ income is often covered mainly by company payouts.23
After adjusting the input data for tax purposes on the basis of information about tax
payments and tax-free income from associated undertakings, e.g. from annual reports,
and tax speciﬁc modiﬁcations,24 the tax bases can be determined. The wealth tax base
is represented by the average value of capitalized market value of quoted corporations or,
for non-listed companies, calculated by the above mentioned weighted average valuation
method.25 Finally, by subtracting the tax allowance of e 2,000,000 we receive a corporate
wealth tax base that is subject to a (halved) tax rate of 0.5%. As corporate wealth is
taxed at corporate level and again as corporate shares at personal level, to avoid double or
multistage taxation half of the usual wealth tax rate (1%) is levied on corporate level and
22 See parameters for the diﬀerent types in tables 1 and 2.
23 Payouts can be either dividend payments, management fees or related salaries.
24 E.g. for trade tax purposes according to §§ 8 and 9 of German Trade Tax Act.
25 Cf. chapter 4.1. This method is implemented in Germany’s Inheritance Tax Code Directives and has
been modiﬁed for § 46 Heritage Tax Valuation Act Provision of the Federal State Schleswig-Holstein.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 9
half on personal level. If the calculated corporate wealth tax is lower than the corporate
tax, then the wealth tax is completely imputable. If a deﬁnitive corporate wealth tax
remains, a ﬁve year wealth tax carry-forward allows future imputation on principle.
Starting in 2005 we simulate gains and taxes until 2014 and determine the present value
of payable taxes. On this basis we derive a ratio describing tax burden in present value
terms and in relation to the present value of pre-tax proﬁts. We assume a pre-tax discount
factor of 4.25%.26 Comparing this tax ratio with the one we receive by neglecting wealth
tax, we can conclude how wealth tax inﬂuences a company or investor’s tax exposure.
Enriching the analysis with personal level eﬀects for medium-sized companies we assume
• businesses with two shareholders, each holding 50% of the company,
• an appropriate employer’s salary that mainly covers personal maintenance,
• 10% of after-tax proﬁts are paid out as dividends
• whereas 90% of after-tax proﬁt increase business wealth and thereby the basis for
future growth
• distributed proﬁts are subject to income tax shareholder relief, i.e. only 50% of this
income is subject to personal income tax,
• the deduced market value of the company’s net assets is reduced by the wealth tax
allowance of e 2,000,000 and further personal tax allowance,27
• personal wealth from corporate stock is subject to personal wealth tax at the (hal-
ved) rate of 0.5%.
We receive the total tax load in every period and in turn, ﬁnally, the change in present
value terms due to wealth taxation.
4.1.3 Impact on Major Listed Corporations
In the following we analyze companies that are representative of large DAX 30 corpora-
tions.
We assume two model corporations characterized by the structure given in table 2 and
subject to the tax burden described in table 3. Here, ’proﬁts’ denotes approximated taxable
income, i.e. proﬁts as shown in the balance sheet increased by taxes and further adjusted
for tax-free amounts included in this value, e.g. tax-free corporate dividend income.
26 On this basis we deduce the post-tax yield for corporations investing alternatively into riskfree bonds
with a 10 year maturity. E.g. 4.25% federal bond, security code 113525, issued July 7, 2004, maturity
July 4, 2014. The pre-tax discount rate is reduced by relevant taxes applying the resulting post-tax
discount factor for determining present value.
27 Cf. chapter 3.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 10
DAX 30 corporations
manufacturing industry ﬁnancial services
in em or % in million em or %
proﬁts 1,900 1,900
capitalized market value 46,000 39,000
gearing rate in percent 69.44 94.34
pre-tax rate of return in percent 4.13 4.87
wealth tax 229.99 194.99
thereof deﬁnitive wealth tax 0 9.009
trade tax 496.26 1,156.08
corporate tax after imputation 120.95 0
supplementary corporate tax 19.30 10.23
tax ratio of proﬁts before wealth tax 47.19 75.69
tax ratio of proﬁts after wealth tax 47.19 77.79
increment in tax ratio due to wealth tax 0 2.10
Table 3: Estimated tax load of DAX 30 corporations
Figure 2 illustrates this structure graphically.
47,19
75,69
0,00
2,10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
manufacturing industry financial services
t
a
x
q
u
o
t
a
taxes on profits wealth tax
t
a
x
r
a
t
i
o
Figure 2: Tax load of listed corporations as fraction of net present value of proﬁts
The relatively high gearing rate of ﬁnancial services corporations causes an extremely
high tax load. This is due to § 8 para. 1 of the German Trade Tax Act that requires the
addition of 50% of deduced long term interest payments to the trade tax base.28
28 Although there are speciﬁc exceptions for ﬁnancial services, e.g., cf. § 19 German Trade Tax Executive
Order, we consider 20% of the liabilities to be representative of an appropriate trade tax adjustment.
Thus, we add 10% of paid long term interest payment to the trade tax base. In contrast, in the case
of corporations from the manufacturing industry we assume a fraction of 60% long term liabilities
among all liabilities as this industry does not enjoy the trade tax privileges that are granted to
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This relatively high trade tax load reduces the corporate tax base of ﬁnancial services
corporations. Thereby, the imputation potential for wealth tax decreases simultaneously.
Finally, imputation backlogs emerge, i.e. wealth tax becomes at least partially deﬁnitive
leading to a higher tax burden of proﬁts than in the case of comparable manufacturing
corporations.
A general postulate for tax systems is the claim for ﬁnancial neutrality. It requires that
investments or companies are taxed independently of the character of the capital employ-
ed. Varying the gearing rate ceteris paribus for type 5 and 6 DAX 30 corporations allows
us to draw conclusions about the sensitivity of the tax ratio towards the degree of utilized
borrowed capital. In most cases we ﬁnd a neutral inﬂuence of wealth tax on the means of
ﬁnance. The result is highlighted for diﬀerent gearing rates in table 4.
DAX 30 corporations
manufacturing industry ﬁnancial services
gearing total tax ratio on total tax ratio on
rate proﬁt + thereof proﬁt + thereof
proﬁt interest wealth tax proﬁt interest wealth tax
payments payments
40% 43.30 29.91 0.00 42.07 25.65 0.00
50% 44.29 27.13 0.00 42.63 21.78 0.00
60% 45.57 24.34 0.00 43.47 17.88 0.00
70% 47.31 21.23 0.00 44.86 13.97 0.00
80% 49.78 18.71 0.00 47.59 10.03 0.00
90% 53.60 15.87 0.00 55.39 6.07 0.00
95% 56.42 14.45 0.00 70.02 4.11 0.57
96% 57.09 14.16 0.00 77.96 3.78 2.14
Table 4: Estimated tax load of DAX 30 corporations depending on gearing rate in %
Focussing on the proﬁt tax load we identify two eﬀects of borrowed capital on the wealth
tax load:
1. A high gearing rate implies high tax deductible interest payments and in turn a
relatively lower corporate tax base.
2. In addition to a direct reduction in the corporate tax base caused by debit interest
payments simultaneously trade tax increases from in fact only 50% deductibility of
long-term interest payment for trade tax purposes.29 As trade tax is corporate tax
deductible, the corporate tax base declines even more.
Consequently, wealth tax is often only partially imputable inducing imputation backlogs.
In summary, wealth tax is not neutral with respect to ways of ﬁnance since the trade tax
29 50% of debit interests have to be added to the tax base again.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 12
adjustment of debit interest payments and interest deduction for corporate tax purposes
may cause a vigorous erosion of the corporate tax base.
Furthermore, we refer to the ’tax burden of proﬁts plus interest payments’, i.e. of the
total value added of employed capital, to interpret the impact of a wealth tax depending
on the capital structure. Again, we observe the well-known discrimination of corporations
in debt mainly due to trade tax eﬀects. Deﬁnitive wealth tax diminishes the relative
tax advantages of borrowed capital. Highly levered corporations’ main tax burden results
from trade tax which unfortunately, does not serve as imputation potential. Thereby, a
deﬁnitive wealth tax is more likely to occur for industries with a typically high gearing
rate.
Another important factor that inﬂuences the relative tax burden in diﬀerent industries is
the underlying pre-tax rate of return. Varying this rate clariﬁes that higher yields imply
high imputation volumes and thereby neutralize wealth tax burden. The drawback of high
gearing rates described above loses signiﬁcance as the yield and the corporate tax increase,
as does the amount of imputable tax (see ﬁgure 3).
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Figure 3: Tax load of listed corporations as fraction of net present value of proﬁts for
various pre-tax rates of return
If we assume no uniform development or growth of proﬁts but instead volatile rates of
return, sensitivity analyses allow us to draw general conclusions. The wealth tax load de-
pends strongly on whether and to what extent imputation backlogs arise in future periods.
In best case scenarios there is only a time lag in imputation implying a rate of interest
eﬀect. In worst case scenarios, the wealth tax remains nonimputable and becomes deﬁni-
tive at the end of the time horizon. Furthermore, the imputation potential and in turn the
tax ratio depends on whether the stock price (market value) anticipates changes in proﬁts4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 13
immediately or rather time lagged. This is important in the case of listed corporations
since the stock market value of the companies determines their wealth tax base. Thus the
wealth tax load is a function of anticipated future proﬁts.
4.1.4 Impact on Medium-Sized Companies
In the following we investigate the inﬂuence of minimum wealth tax on medium-sized
companies of diﬀerent legal status. Hence, we have to extend the model framework with
respect to personal level taxation of distributed gains and salaries to managing sharehol-
ders. We model two typical businesses: one corporation and one partnership as shown in
table 5. A comparison enables us to conclude about neutrality property of AMT wealth
tax referring to diﬀerent legal forms.
Capital intensive medium-sized companies
corporation partnership
in e or percent in e or percent
company level
proﬁts 1,914,000 1,914,000
market capitalization 12,913,000 12,913,000
gearing rate in percent 73.20 73.20
pre-tax rate of return in percent 12.41 12.41
corporate wealth tax 54,565
thereof deﬁnitive wealth tax 0
trade tax 313,200 361,598
corporate tax after imputation 267,606
supplementary corporate tax 17,719
personal level
personal wealth tax 52,565 105,130
thereof deﬁnitive wealth tax 36,457 0
income tax after imputation 112,070 381,373
supplementary income tax 7,050 29,756
overall
tax ratio of proﬁts before wealth tax 41.49 46.12
tax ratio of proﬁts after wealth tax 49.20 46.12
increment in tax ratio due to wealth tax 7.71 0
Table 5: Estimated tax load of capital intensive medium-sized companies
’Proﬁts’ in table 5 comprises employer’s salaries for managing shareholders because they
are treated diﬀerently for tax purposes in corporations and partnerships. While they are
corporate tax-deductible they are not deductible from the income tax base of partners.
On the basis of data of the German Federal Bank for companies of the modelled size
we assume managerial salaries of e 312,020 per annum with GNP growth over time.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 14
Net wealth is not assumed to be identical with balance sheet equity due to the weighted
average valuation method that combines net asset value (equity) and discounted future
proﬁts. We apply this valuation approach and ﬁnally receive the tax loads as illustrated
in ﬁgure 4.
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Figure 4: Tax load of capital intensive medium-sized companies as fraction of net present
value of proﬁts depending on legal status
As mentioned above for the corporation we assume a retaining rate of 90% in our simu-
lation of assessment. Instead, minimizing deﬁnitive personal wealth tax rather requires
relatively high personal income tax for imputation purposes, hence an appropriate low
retaining rate is more likely. Distributing only 10% of proﬁts implies low income tax pay-
ments for the dividend and further, low imputation potential for personal wealth tax on
the underlying shares. Since imputable income tax is limited to tax on dividend income30
personal income tax on managerial salaries is not available for imputation purposes. Thus,
we receive a deﬁnitive wealth tax of e 36,457 for a capital intensive medium-sized cor-
poration. The values in this table have to be put into the right perspective. It is quite
probable that the shareholders wish to generate a higher imputation potential at personal
level and therefore decide to distribute a higher fraction of corporate proﬁts. But they
have to take into account a trade oﬀ. Distributing proﬁts earlier implies a rate of interest
drawback due to earlier income payments and in turn earlier income tax payments. This
drawback has to be compared with the advantage of a higher imputation volume.
In fact, the relation between the shareholder’s income tax bracket, proﬁts and wealth de-
termines tax planning activities and in turn the dividend policy. Depending on individual
30 In this example income tax on dividend payments to the corporate shareholder is only e 16,108.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 15
shareholder’s inﬂuence on the dividend payout it may be possible to minimize the tax
load by expanding the fraction of distributed proﬁts in this context.
This example illustrates the considerable impact of the AMT wealth tax on entrepreneurial
behavior, e.g. dividend policy. In contrast to the well-known lock-in eﬀect of shareholder
relief in income taxation of dividends, taxing wealth evokes a push-out eﬀect, i.e. increased
pay out of proﬁts. Assuming a retention rate of 90% as in table 4 we ﬁnd an increase in total
tax load of 7.71 percentage points. Retaining less, e.g. less than 65.5% can neutralize the
wealth tax load. Higher personal income from higher dividends and in turn higher income
tax as imputation potential, eliminates the wealth tax load completely.
In a partnership with identical proﬁt and wealth structures, deﬁnitive wealth tax usually
does not occur at all. Total income from the partnership, i.e. proﬁts and salaries for
partners, evokes income tax that can be used for imputation purposes.31 Whenever the
company’s rate of return is suﬃciently high, no imputation backlogs will occur.
4.2 Investment Decisions
Usually it is desirable from a tax policy perspective that funds are invested in high yield
projects in order to evoke maximum economic growth eﬀects. If the government does
not explicitly subsidize or discriminate speciﬁc economic activities, tax should not distort
investment decisions and thereby is intended to be neutral.32 As control or guidance of
capital allocation is not the intention of a minimum wealth tax - on the contrary, it is
supposed to prevent tax evasion - AMT wealth tax should be as non-distortive as possible.
In order to analyze the impact of the underlying wealth tax on entrepreneurial investment
decisions, we model an investor willing to engage in an investment project or company
(real investment), for a period of 4, 8, 12, 16 or 25 years. Alternatively funds may be
invested in bonds on the capital market. Per assumption, both alternatives earn identical
pre-tax rates of return. This implies that the real investment is a marginal investment with
a pre-tax net present value that equals the initial outlay. Thus, both investments have
identical yields before taxes. We assume a pre-tax rate of return of 3.5%. The integration
of taxes on proﬁts and a wealth tax into the model enables our partial analysis to provide
insights into the inﬂuence of minimum wealth tax on individual investment decisions.33
31 Conversely, in corporations only income tax on dividend income serves as imputation potential po-
tential, whereas income tax on managerial salaries does not.
32 Referring to neutral tax systems it should only be noted that the cash ﬂow tax and the Johansson-
Samuelson tax are special cases of such neutral tax systems. Cf. Brown (1948); Johansson (1969) and
Samuelson (1964).
33 For an elaborated investigation of the inﬂuence of taxes on investment decisions under uncertainty
and a deduction of neutral tax systems cf. Niemann (1999); Sureth (2002); Niemann/Sureth (2004,
2005).4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 16
However, conclusions about aggregate macroeconomic developments cannot be deduced
from this approach.
4.2.1 Diminishing Cash Flows
Depending on the economic life of an investment object with diminishing cash ﬂows and
legally allowed depreciation rules we ﬁnd wealth taxation discriminating real against ﬁ-
nancial investment. The ﬁnancial investment suﬀers from neither absolute nor relative
cuts in return caused by wealth tax. A pre-tax rate of return of 3.5% eliminates the deﬁ-
nitive wealth tax load of the ﬁnancial investment. While for a real investment depreciation
allowances lead to temporary wealth tax imputation backlogs.
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Figure 5: Relative change in rate of return due to wealth tax in case of diminishing cash
ﬂows in comparison to ﬁnancial investment, in % of market rate of return
In ﬁgure 5 a zero relative reduction of the rate of return implies investment neutral
taxation, i.e. equal taxational treatment of real and ﬁnancial investments. We can hence
see the distorting inﬂuence of proﬁt and wealth taxation. Both types of tax reduce the
relative rate of return of the real investment, i.e. discriminate against real investments.
We ﬁnd that the observed considerable distortions of wealth tax in ﬁgure 5 are caused
in only a few periods of the economic life. Assuming an economic life of 4 and 8 years
imputation backlogs occur only in the last two periods. For an economic life of 12, 16 or
25 years only the last 3, 6 or 15 periods cause the deﬁnitive wealth tax load to lead to
severe relative yield cuts and the distortions.
This repressive inﬂuence of wealth tax is caused by the conjunction of diminishing cash
ﬂows and typically declining depreciation allowances. Here, the present value of a neutral4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 17
depreciation schedule, i.e. economic depreciation,34 is higher than the present value of
linear or declining depreciation of the initial outlay that is usually employed for tax
purposes. Consequently, in this case the legal depreciation pattern invokes a higher proﬁt
tax base in early periods than under a neutral economic depreciation. Further, in future
periods taxable proﬁt is lower than in the case of neutral taxation. These low tax bases are
not suﬃcient for imputing wealth tax of this period completely. Overall, we can deduce
that real investment suﬀers from wealth tax discrimination if cash ﬂows decrease over
time.
4.2.2 Increasing Cash Flows
In contrast, increasing cash ﬂows induce opposite eﬀects. Real investment is subsidized by
taxation in relation to ﬁnancial investment (ﬁgure 6). Focussing on the minimum wealth
tax, we realize again a relative drawback for real investment.
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Figure 6: Relative change in rate of return due to wealth tax in case of increasing cash
ﬂows in comparison to ﬁnancial investment, in % of market rate of return
Now, the present value of economic depreciation is lower than the taxational depreciation
in present value terms. The latter invokes higher early depreciation allowances and lower
later amounts than neutral depreciation. This induces an interest rate advantage for real
investments, an eﬀect that increases as cash ﬂow growth accelerates over time.
As high depreciation in early periods leads to low taxable proﬁts, wealth imputation back-
logs occur. The wealth tax therefore becomes partially deﬁnitive. Here, minimum taxation
34 This is a well-known feature of a system that taxes true economic proﬁt, i.e. the so-called Samuelson-
Johansson tax. Cf. Samuelson (1964); Johansson (1969).4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 18
succeeds in invoking a positive tax load where regular taxation of proﬁts understates the
correct economic tax base due to accelerated taxational depreciation.
In summary, we observe a reduction of depreciation-induced advantages in proﬁt taxa-
tion by minimum wealth tax. In comparison to taxes levied on earnings from ﬁnancial
investments, real investments still enjoy tax privileges overall.
Furthermore, we can imagine scenarios, e.g. with a rather low market rate of return, where
wealth taxation even ampliﬁes subsidies from proﬁt taxation. Then, a ﬁnancial investment
does not ensure full imputation of wealth tax but evokes a deﬁnitive wealth tax burden
to a higher extent than in the case of an alternative real investment.
From these examples we see that the overall tax impact is particularly sensitive towards the
time structure of cash ﬂows and depreciation rules. Often, cash ﬂow from real investments
will not be uniform but volatile. Thus, phases with increasing and diminishing cash ﬂows
may alternate. Then the likelihood of imputation backlogs increases.
Unique conclusions about the inﬂuence of the assumed wealth tax on proﬁtability of real
investments are not possible.
4.2.3 Interdependencies of Proﬁt-Oriented and Wealth-Oriented Minimum
Taxation
Until now we have neglected the eﬀects of loss oﬀset rules that are typical in corporate
and income tax law. This aspect becomes important as AMT wealth tax becomes deﬁ-
nitive in loss periods. Additionally, losses reduce taxpayers’ wealth and thereby inﬂuence
the wealth tax base of future periods. Furthermore, interdependencies between minimum
proﬁt taxation caused by loss oﬀset limitations and minimum wealth taxation have to be
taken into account when determining the total tax burden of an investment.
In Germany, in 2004 the compensation of losses using future gains was limited. If loss carry-
forwards exceed an amount of e 1,000,000 only 60% of taxable gains can be compensated
through it. This minimum taxation ampliﬁes the asymmetric taxation of gains and losses
and may discriminate against investments and companies with proﬁtable investments
including temporary losses.35 Consequently, when comparing two investment objects with
identical pre-tax return but where one has a non-uniform time structure of cash ﬂows
especially with alternating gains and losses, and the other has uniform positive cash ﬂows
over time, we realize that the object with temporary losses is subject to minimum wealth
taxation.36
35 Cf. Niemann (2004).
36 In addition to proﬁt AMT.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 19
In order to integrate the inﬂuence of loss oﬀset limitation into our analysis we model a
marginal investment project starting with negative cash ﬂows in the ﬁrst periods. Then
cash ﬂows grow per assumption and late cash ﬂows are correspondingly high. This is a
possible scenario for a new pioneer entrepreneur whose investment, after initial losses,
generates the same overall pre-tax yield as the alternative capital market investment. In
such a model it is again possible to isolate taxational eﬀects.
As described, we focus on an investment with increasing cash ﬂows, similar to the one mo-
delled in chapter 4.2.2. Such an investment object, as has been shown above, is subsidized
by taxational depreciation rules. Consequently, abstracting from the eﬀects of loss oﬀset
limitations, i.e. in case of complete loss oﬀset, a post-tax rate of return that is higher than
the one for alternative ﬁnancial investment is generated.
Assuming that losses are not immediately tax-deductible but only have time-lagged full
loss oﬀset by the end of the time horizon causes an interest rate drawback. Loss oﬀset
limitation, as introduced into German tax law, delays loss compensation and in turn
increases the interest rate drawback, hence invokes inherently a minimum taxation.
Taxation of wealth (partially) compensates this disadvantage if the alternative investment
is subject to deﬁnitive wealth tax (ﬁgure 7).37
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Figure 7: Relative change in rate of return due to wealth tax with temporary losses in
comparison to capital market investment, in % of capital market rate of return
37 Financial investment causes deﬁnitive wealth taxation if the rate of return is very low. In the under-
lying example we chose a pre-tax rate of return of 2%.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 20
In the case modelled in chapter 4.2.2 the alternative ﬁnancial investment is wealth tax-free
because of a suﬃciently high pre-tax yield. Now, per assumption, ﬁnancial investments
are subject to deﬁnitive wealth tax. Hence, levying a wealth tax on real investments with
increasing proﬁts, rather low pre-tax rate of return and assuming full loss oﬀset, favors real
in comparison to ﬁnancial investment. The wealth tax ampliﬁes the so-called proﬁt tax
paradox, i.e. in wealth tax context the depreciation-induced relative proﬁt tax advantage
occurs as well. Asset values decline due to deprecation and in turn the wealth tax base
decreases. Consequently, under full loss oﬀset, wealth taxation causes a relative increase
in the post-tax rate of return of such real investments.
As can be seen in ﬁgure 7, the eﬀect from this wealth tax paradox may exceed the interest
rate drawback that occurs if loss oﬀset limitations are integrated into this scenario. In
this case temporary losses from real investments
1. reduce the wealth tax base while
2. loss oﬀset limitation invokes relatively higher (positive) proﬁt taxes and in turn a
larger imputation volume.
Instead, if an alternative capital market investment is not subject to deﬁnitive wealth tax
– which is the case if the ﬁnancial investment’s yield is suﬃciently high – the investor
will refrain from the real investment because of its discriminating minimum (proﬁt and
wealth) taxation.
4.2.4 Liquidity and Risk-Taking
Besides impacting on proﬁtability wealth tax induces negative eﬀects on liquidity. Inde-
pendently of the time structure of cash ﬂows, whenever a deﬁnitive wealth tax emerges
liquidity is reduced. As in reality the assumptions of perfect capital markets like unlimited
opportunities to borrow funds are not met, liquidity constraints may cause bankruptcy.
This problem gains signiﬁcance if periods with temporary losses have already aﬀected
liquidity considerably. Furthermore, the underlying wealth tax that often discriminates
against (risky) real investments will decrease the investor’s willingness to take risks,38
rather encouraging him to invest in riskfree bonds.
38 Referring to the inﬂuence of taxes on risk-taking cf. the seminal paper by Stiglitz (1969).4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 21
4.3 Cross-Border Investments
Until now, we have abstracted from the cross-border economic implications of introducing
an AMT wealth tax. As it is a wealth tax that weakens the economic attractiveness of
a country for local and international direct investment and instead encourages capital
export, which invokes undesirable cuts in public revenues, it is important to include this
in our analysis. Although these eﬀects are diﬃcult to quantify we can deduce some general
qualitative conclusions for international tax planning. In this context two aspects are
crucial: Wealth tax may inﬂuence
• direct investment activities of foreign investors in the AMT country (inbound in-
vestment) and
• national investors’ disposition to invest their funds abroad (outbound investment).
As is known from income and corporate tax law, wealth tax law distinguishes between
unlimited and limited liability to pay taxes. Hence, national taxpayers have to assess
total (global) wealth while foreign taxpayers have to assess their local wealth. Whether
the deﬁned liability to pay taxes in the end leads to a wealth tax burden or not depends,
besides speciﬁc regulations in wealth tax law, on double taxation agreements.
For residents, double taxation agreements usually exempt wealth from foreign permanent
establishments and substantial cross-shareholdings in foreign subsidiaries. Consequently,
irrespective of the legal status of the foreign business unit no wealth tax is levied on
wealth from cross-border investments in permanent establishments in the home country.
In the case of resident corporations holding shares in foreign subsidiaries, the international
cross-holding privilege assures tax exemption for substantial shares.
The wealth of non-residents is subject to local wealth tax only in case of local real estate
or local permanent establishments.39 Beyond this, the local wealth of non-residents is
not subject to local wealth tax according to common double taxation agreements. Thus,
shares of local corporations held by non-residents individuals or companies are not wealth
taxable. Consequently, wealth as corporate shares of foreigners is not subject to local
wealth tax, regardless of the size of the holding. Hence, in inbound cases wealth tax
becomes relevant only at local corporate level.
We can see that common double taxation agreements ensure the wealth taxation of local
business assets of non-residents. Instead, resident individuals have to declare their global
wealth to local tax authorities.
39 Cf. Art. 22 OECD-Model Convention.4 Inﬂuence of Wealth Tax as AMT on Business Structures and Investment Decisions 22
4.3.1 Inbound Investment
Introducing AMT wealth tax in one country implies an additional tax burden for invest-
ments of non-residents if this wealth tax becomes deﬁnitive. Inbound investments into
permanent establishments are wholly subject to wealth tax. Inbound investments in local
corporate subsidiaries will be taxed at the rate of 0.5% at corporate level. Non-resident
shareholders from countries without corresponding double taxation agreements are liable
to wealth tax according to national regulations on limited tax liability. In contrast, non-
resident shareholders from double taxation agreement countries are not wealth tax liable
with regard to their local corporate shares.
From this we cannot conclude that the (re-)introduction of wealth tax exercises a negative
inﬂuence on the relative attractiveness of this country for foreign direct investments. The
inﬂuence of a local wealth tax on international capital allocation depends in particular
on whether or not the investor’s home country raises a corresponding national wealth
tax too. If the home state levies a wealth tax it is possible that the introduction of a
wealth tax in the country of investment will not invoke any repressive eﬀects on the direct
investment behavior of non-residents. This may be a result of full imputation of local
wealth tax on the home country wealth tax, assuming that the home state wealth tax
burden is relatively higher. Then, home state (wealth) taxation is structured according to
the principle of capital export neutrality implying location neutrality.
If an investor’s home country does not raise a wealth tax or if cross-border investment is
exempted from home state wealth tax, the implementation of a wealth tax in the country
of investment will increase this investment’s tax load. As most OECD member countries
do not raise a (corporate) wealth tax, the introduction of a wealth tax in one OECD
country will alleviate this country’s attractiveness for direct investment, especially for
projects with an initial loss.40
Furthermore, implementing a wealth tax may be interpreted as a negative signal imply-
ing that other increases in taxes are likely to occur. This could interfere with investor
conﬁdence in the quality of this location.
4.3.2 Outbound Investment
As for inbound investment, the inﬂuence of a national wealth tax on outbound real invest-
ment depends on tax rules concerning wealth taxation in other countries and the wealth
tax treatment of alternative investments. As far as national taxpayers have to pay wealth
40 Then, minimum wealth tax often will become deﬁnitive because of a lack of proﬁt taxes which may
serve as imputation potential.5 Conclusions 23
tax on national and cross-border investment, national wealth tax may be neutral with
respect to international decisions concerning location.
Double taxation agreements on wealth tax usually exempt outbound investments from
national wealth tax. As a taxpayer can avoid national wealth tax by investing abroad, this
capital import neutral regulation encourages outbound investment. We ﬁnd corresponding
results for corporate wealth tax. Consequently, the introduction of a national wealth tax
provides an incentive for national taxpayers to invest abroad.
Applying this to international tax planning, it may be possible to reduce or avoid the
wealth tax burden. E.g., founding a group ﬁnance holding abroad decreases equity and
thereby the wealth of a resident group of companies. Several other arrangements depending
on single case factors may enable the avoidance of wealth taxation at home. In principle,
the tax planner has to verify whether these structures conﬂict with other regulations, e.g.
thin capitalization rules.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a wealth tax at corporate and personal level designed as an
AMT, as proposed by the German Green Party. This wealth tax is imputable to proﬁt
taxes and thereby is intended to prevent from multiple (multistage) taxation.
Referring to data from annual reports and the German Central Bank and modelling
enterprises of diﬀerent structure, industry, size and legal status, we show that companies
in the service industry with usually rather high gearing rates are more likely to be subject
to deﬁnitive wealth tax than capital intensive industries. This result runs counter to to
well-known eﬀects of a common wealth tax. Capital intensive ﬁrms, e.g. in the metal
industry, are burdened with deﬁnitive wealth tax only in case they have high loss carry-
forwards or extremely volatile proﬁts.
We ﬁnd that the proposed tax allowance protects small business from being subject to
minimum wealth tax as well as medium-sized companies with relatively low capital em-
ployed. In the case of medium-sized capital intensive companies, partnerships often enjoy
wealth tax privileges due to uniform taxation at individual level. Conversely, corporations
may be burdened by the wealth tax at corporate and personal level caused by imputation
backlogs. Furthermore, the underlying AMT inﬂuences corporate dividend policy, which
evokes a push-out eﬀect.
We demonstrate that this kind of wealth taxation usually favors ﬁnancial rather than real
investments and encourages outbound investments.References 24
An alternative minimum tax as imputable wealth tax – similar to other minimum tax
concepts – burdens real investment with volatile gains relatively more than an equivalent
ﬁnancial investment. Investments in ﬁnancial assets usually enjoy full imputation of the
wealth tax. In contrast, industries with volatile gains and temporary losses, such as newly
founded businesses, suﬀer from wealth tax drawbacks. Hence, the analyzed wealth tax
reduces the investor’s disposition to invest into risky real projects while simultaneously
encouraging outbound investment and in turn capital export. Consequently, wealth tax
revenues from the entrepreneurial sector may not meet expectations but instead, medium-
term or long-term overall tax revenues may even decrease. Capital export will cause not
only lost wealth tax revenue but also a decline in revenue from proﬁt taxation (corporate
tax, trade tax, income tax, etc.). Hence, the net revenue resulting from the introduction
of the minimum wealth tax may be negative.
As long as there are rules in income and corporate tax law that allow the assessment of
a tax base that is smaller than economic income, this distortion must be eliminated by
amending the tax code, not by introducing (yet) another tax.
We ﬁnd that the introduction of an AMT discriminates against many ﬁrms and investment
projects, especially if economic income is lower than taxable income. This emphasizes that
whenever income is taxed correctly, AMT is dispensable.
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